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I.
STATEMENT 0~' THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by Defendants Aerocet, Inc. and State Insurance Fund from a decision
of the Idaho Industrial Commission in a consolidated workers' compensation claim for two cases
filed by Claimant George McGivney (McGivney). The first case involves a claim by Claimant
against his Employer Aerocet, Inc. ("Aerocet") and its Surety State Insurance Fund ("SIF") for a
left knee meniscal injury suffered on May 6, 2011. The second case involves a claim by
McGivney against Employer Quest Aircraft Company, Inc. ("Quest") and its Surety Federal
Insurance Company ("Federal") for left knee meniscal injury suffered in an accident on March 5,
2014.
B.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ultimately, the facts of the case are not complex. McGivney suffered a left knee injury on

May 6, 2011, a medial meniscus tear, a result of which he underwent surgery. At the time of that
surgery, a more invasive total knee procedure was contemplated but not undertaken. Instead, Dr.
Mclnnis performed an arthroscopy with meniscus debridement and repair. He cautioned,
however, that the arthroscopy was only a temporary fix and would not change the ultimate
prognosis or natural history of McGivney's underlying arthritis, which would eventually require
a total knee replacement. McGivney was found MMI on November 17, 2011, and thereafter he
was assigned a 2% lower extremity impairment. Neither McGivney nor Aerocet/SIF requested a
Hearing or settled the claim thereafter, and no disability determination was made by the

-

-----·--~---
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Industrial Commission.
McGivney changed jobs to Quest in October 17, 2011, and then suffered a new left knee
injury on March 5, 2014. This new injury resulted in additional damage to the medial meniscus,
and ultimately McGivney sought surgery again. The surgeon opted to perform a
unicompartmental knee replacement surgery to repair the new damage as well as address the
preexisting, progressive degenerative issues. As a result of this surgery, McGivney was assigned
a 21 % lower extremity PPI rating, which was apportioned by the surgeon and an IME physician 50% to the 2011 injury and 50% to the 2014 injury.
McGivney filed Complaints against Aerocet/SIF and Quest/Federal, and thereafter filed a
Motion to Consolidate the two claims. AR 1-18. Quest/Federal filed Defendants' Notice ofNonOpposition to McGivney's Motion to Consolidate on April 29, 2015. AR 19-20. McGivney's
deposition was taken on May 12, 2015, and Counsel for both Aerocet/SIF and Quest/Federal
attended and participated in the deposition. Aerocet/SIF served its Objection to McGivney's
Motion to Consolidate also on May 12, 2015, although it is notable that the footer to the
Objection was incorrectly labeled "Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum." AR 21-22. On
May 15, 2015, McGivney filed a Response to Defendants' Objection to McGivney's Motion to
Consolidate, indicating McGivney was not made aware at the time of the deposition that there
was any objection to consolidation of the claims. AR 23-25. The Commission issued its Order to
Consolidate on May 19, 2015. AR2!-22.
On September 11, 2015, McGivney filed a Motion for payment of benefits by
Quest/Federal pending a determination of liability pursuant to Idaho Code §72-313. AR 40-43.

---··----·----------
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As raised by McGivney in the motion for consolidation of the claims, McGivney reasoned
therein that either Aerocet/SIF or Quest/Federal was responsible for the knee replacement
surgery and related time-loss benefits, and the issue of dispute was liability as between the two
Employer/Sureties. In its responsive pleading, Aerocet/SIF maintained no benefits were due in
relation to the 2011 injury. AR 44-46. The Commission issued its Order Granting McGivney's
Motion for payment of benefits pending a determination of liability pursuant to Idaho Code §72313. AR 47-48, 51-52. As a result of this Order, Quest/Federal was ordered to pay Claimant's
benefits, which was done. (See AR 161, Footnote 1).
Referee Powers conducted a Hearing in Coeur d'Alene on November 8, 2016. At the
Hearing, the Referee and parties clarified the issues before the Industrial Commission. Hearing
Transcript ("Tr.") pp. 4-7. The issues were also summarized in the Brief of Defendants Aerocet,
Inc. and State Insurance Fund, filed June 8, 2017. ("Appellants' Brief'). The issues at Hearing
were whether and to what extent McGivney' s condition was due in whole or in part to a
preexisting condition, whether and to what extent McGivney as entitled to worker's
compensation benefits and the extent thereof, apportionment for a preexisting condition,
reimbursement to Quest pursuant to Idaho Code §72-313, and whether McGivney was entitled to
an award of attorney fees. Any objections to consolidation of the claims did not arise during the
Hearing or in Aerocet/SIF's Brief.
The Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on
December 22, 2017, not adopting the Referee's recommendations. ("IC Decision"). AR 109-132.
Pursuant to that Decision, the Commission determined the following: McGivney suffered a 21 %
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lower extremity permanent partial impairment (PP!), which was apportioned 50% to the 2011
injury (Aerocet/SIF) and 50% to the 2014 injury (Quest/Federal); Medical benefits incurred in
relation to a June 25, 2014, left knee arthroplasty surgery and subsequent treatment, and related
time loss benefits following surgery should be apportioned 50/50 between Aerocet/SIF and
Quest/Federal; McGivney suffered a 50% disability (PPD) inclusive of impairment, and said
disability should be apportioned equally between Aerocet/SIF and Quest/Federal; and,
McGivney was not entitled to an award of attorney fees. Pursuant to this Order, Quest/Federal
has continued to pay McGivney his awarded benefits. Aerocet/SIF has paid nothing.
The issues before the Idaho Industrial Commission boiled down to which of the two
Employers/Sureties were responsible for the surgery performed in 2014, and apportionment of
impairment and disability between the two industrial accidents. The gist of the appeal is
Appellants assert they owe no benefits. Aerocet/SIF challenge the Commission's apportionment
of any permanent impairment (PP!) to the 2011 accident above a 2% PP! previously paid, the
finding of liability by Aerocet/SIF for payment of any medical or time-loss benefits subsequent
to November 17, 2011, and the award of any disability relating to the 2011 accident and injury.
Respondents Quest/Federal asserts the Industrial Commission properly consolidated the two
cases, and properly made a determination as to the extent to which the respective
Employers/Sureties were liable for benefits. Quest/Federal further assert the Commission's
Decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, and Appellants' arguments are
merely a request for this Court to re-weigh the evidence. Accordingly, the Commission's
Decision should not be disturbed on appeal.

-------

Quest/Federal seeks an award of attorney fees

"

-

·-
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pursuant to I.C. §72-804.

II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented on appeal by Aerocet and SIF include the following:
I. Whether the Commission erred as a matter of law in applying I.C. §72-422, 72-425,
and/or 72-432 to determine permanent impairment and permanent disability for the
2011 and 2014 injuries?
2. Whether the Commission erred as a matter of law in consolidating J.C. 2011-011043
with I.C. 2014-019179 and by failing to adjudicate McGivney's disability from the
2011 injury separate from the total disability and prior to apportioning the same?
3. Whether the Commission erred as a matter law in applying Brown v. Home Depot,
152 Idaho 605, 272 P.3d 577 (2012) in determining McGivney's disability in excess
of impairment at the time of hearing rather than at the time McGivney reached
maximum medical improvement in connection with his 2011 injury?
4. Whether the Commission erred as a matter of law in apportioning disability between
the 2011 and 2014 injuries?
Respondent raises the additional issue of entitlement to attorney fees as against Appellant
pursuant to J.C. §72-804.

III.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing an appeal from the Industrial Commission, the Court will uphold the

--------·
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findings of the Commission if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the
record. Idaho Code §72-732; Lethrud v. State, 126 Idaho 560,563,887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995).
Evidence is "substantial and competent" if a reasonable mind might accept such evidence as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion. Reiher v. American Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58,
60, 878 P.2d 757, 759 (1994). The Court will not disturb the Commission's findings on the
weight and credibility of the evidence unless the conclusions are clearly erroneous. Shubert v.

Macy's W., Inc., 158 Idaho 92, 98, 343 P.3d 1099, 1105 (2015). The Court will not re-weigh
evidence. Watson v. Joslin Millwork, Inc., 149 Idaho 850, 854, 243 P.3d 666, 670 (2010). The
Court's review is limited to a review of the questions of law. Brown v. Home Depot, 152 Idaho
605, 610, 272 P.3d 577, 582 (2012), citing Art. V, §8 of the Idaho Constitution. The
interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court extends free review. Carrier

v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist. #84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006).
IV.
ARGUMENT

Aerocet/SIF essentially request this Court re-weigh the evidence and re-decide the
findings of the Industrial Commission. Appellants contend the Commission erred as a matter of
law at essentially every step of the proceeding, first challenging the Commission's consolidation
of the claims, then ignoring the Commission's detailed analysis and consideration of the medical
evidence to challenge the well-reasoned conclusion that McGivney's need for medical treatment
and the resulting impairment and disability were the result of the combination of McGivney' s
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2011 and 2014 industrial injuries, and finally disputing the award of impairment and disability
and apportionment of benefits between the 2011 and 2014 injuries.
The fact that the preexisting condition related to a previously "stable" industrial injury is
irrelevant to the issue of apportionment, and Appellants' arguments are not supported by the
Statute or precedent. The facts remain that McGivney's impairment and disability were not
adjudicated in 2011 or at the time he was MMI, and his condition which may have been stable at
some time prior to his 2014 injury did degenerate and did contribute to McGivney's need for
subsequent surgical intervention, additional impairment, and disability in excess of impairment.
As such, the Commission had jurisdiction to determine the nature and extent of McGivney' s
entitlement to benefits. Quest/Federal respectfully submit that the Industrial Commission
properly consolidated the claims, properly made a determination as to McGivney's permanent
impairment rating and disability at the time of the Hearing, and then properly made its
determination as to the extent to which McGivney' s permanent impairment and disability should
be apportioned as between his most recent industrial injury and his preexisting condition.
A. McGivney's 2011 and 2014 claims were necessarily and appropriately consolidated, and
the Commission's Decision and method of apportioning benefits are supported by
substantial and competent evidence.

In the present case, Aerocet/SIF take issue with the Commission's consolidation of
McGivney's two claims involving injuries to his left knee that occurred less than three (3) years
apart. The medical evidence in the case demonstrates that McGivney had preexisting arthritis in

- - - - · · · · - ··------·----·-·------·~------ - - - - · - - - - - - -
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his left knee, and he suffered essentially the same physical injuries from his two industrial
accidents - that being a meniscal tear in 2011 and additional tearing of the same meniscus in
2014. However, by 2014 McGivney had interim deterioration of his prior compromised knee
condition, and thus, rather than pursue another simple meniscal repair surgery, the treating
surgeon proposed a more extensive total knee surgery to be undertaken to address the totality of
the damage to the left knee. Despite these undisputed facts, Aerocet/SIF argue the Commission's
consolidation of the claims was done out of administrative convenience, and the assessment of
disability and apportionment of liability robbed them of their rights to a separate determination
of the 2011 claim on its own substantive merits. Appellants' argument is flawed for several
reasons, and as such, the Commission's Decision should not be disturbed on appeal.
Certainly, it is presumed there was indeed some element of "administrative convenience"
as viewed by the Industrial Commission. The "convenience" lies not just with the Industrial
Commission, but also the Claimant. Under the Aerocet/SIF procedural proposal, Mr. McGivney
would have been required to undergo two separate Hearing dates. Aerocet/SIF does not present
us any argument that somehow McGivney' s testimony would have been different between the
two sets of Hearing dates.

Additionally, Mr. McGivney would have been subjected to paying

testifying experts twice for offering post-hearing deposition testimony subsequent to each
Hearing. Mr. McGivney would have been required to write two post-hearing briefs to present to
the presiding Referee. In turn, the Referee would have been required to sit through two separate
Hearings to listen to the same Lay and Expert witness testimony (presented twice) - once again
with no facts being presented by Aerocet/SIF that any such testimony would have differed from

--

-~-·--------·----

·----------·------
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what we see actually happened in this case. On top of all this, if there had indeed been two
separate Hearings conducted there would be the distinct possibility of inconsistent results as to
McGivney's entitlement to various benefits.

Assuming that Aerocet/SIF might tell this court

that the chances of getting inconsistent results from two separate Hearings would have been
extremely unlikely, then the obvious response from this Respondent would be the rhetorical
question: Then why is there a problem with consolidation if the results would be the same?
McGivney's 2011 claim was not adjudicated or settled. McGivney was certainly entitled
to explore additional benefits as permitted under the Statute. McGivney made a timely claim for
additional benefits for his 2011 injury claim, and as such the Commission not only had
jurisdiction, but was required, to make a determination as to benefits McGivney may have been
entitled to said injury, including any additional medical treatment, time loss, impairment, and
disability, and any apportionment therefor. Idaho Code §§72-406, 72-707.
Likewise, Aerocet/SIF could have explored its exposure for disability benefits between
2011 and 2014. The record is devoid of any such activity on the part of Aerocet/SIF.
Aerocet/SIF claims that the 2011 case was "a straightforward case" and that "it [was] not
necessary to duly complicate LC. No. 2011-011043 with a subsequent case with a different
employer, [LC. No. 2014-019179]. Quest/Federal would posit the following in response: What
more compelling set of facts would support consolidation than two distinct industrial injuries to
the exact same part of the anatomy of a worker performing the same occupational duties for two
separate employers?

The fact remains that the cases were necessarily intertwined both in

medical and legal causation. McGivney suffered two accidents and the treating surgeon, as well
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as an Independent Medical Evaluator, related the need for medical treatment and resultant
impairment to each of the two accidents. Consolidation of the two accident claims was not
merely a procedural convenience, and it is ridiculous to argue that consolidation of the two
claims somehow changed the rights/obligations of the parties pursuant to the provisions of Title
72, Idaho Code. In this case, consolidation was necessary for the Commission to make a
reasoned determination as to McGivney's entitlement to statutory benefits. As was his right,
McGivney filed Complaints on both claims within the parameters of the time limitations set forth
in LC. §72-706(2).

It just so happened that in exercising this procedural "right" as against

Aerocet/SIF, Mr. McGivney had, in the interim, suffered a second industrial injury to the same
portion of the left knee. The substantive rights of the parties were duly considered by the
Industrial Commission. The Commission then provided substantial and competent evidence in
support of its determination as to the respective liability of each of the two Employers/Sureties.
Based upon the well-reasoned opinions of medical personnel. Accordingly, the Commission
properly consolidated the 2011 and 2014 claims, and as will be discussed further herein, the
Decision and method of apportioning disability was supported by substantial and competent
evidence.
B. The issue of McGivney's disability referable to his respective industrial injuries was

properly before the Commission, and properly determined and apportioned by the
Commission.
Aerocet/SIF argues McGivney's claim was "done" when McGivney was deemed
medically stable following his 2011 injury. They assert no further impairment is due once a

-------------- -

-·-----------
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rating is assigned by a treating physician, and that disability, if any, should be assigned at the
time the impairment rating was issued. Interestingly, Aerocet/SIF provided no vocational
evidence in support of their position as to disability (or lack thereof), but insist that even though
no disability determination was made in 2011, or at any time before 2014, McGivney's return to
work necessarily implied he had no disability. To imply that Aerocet/SIFs would be entitled to
"stop time" and preclude any further analysis of their liability by the Commission is neither
equitable, nor supported by any statutory language in Title 72, Idaho Code or case law.

Idaho Code §72-422 provides:
Permanent impairment. - "Permanent impairment" is any anatomic or functional
abnormality or loss after maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved and
which abnormality or loss, medically, is considered stable or nonprogressive at
the time of evaluation. Permanent impairment is a basic consideration in the
evaluation of permanent disability, and is a contributing fact to, but not
necessarily an indication of, the entire extent of permanent disability.
[Emphasis added].
Neither the Statute nor case law suggests that permanent impairment is permanently fixed in time
and cannot be modified based on any change of condition. 1 In fact, Statute provides that "[t]he
employer shall provide for an injured employee such reasonable medical [care] ... as may be
reasonably required by the employee's physician ... " as long as the need for treatment is
reasonably related to the claimed industrial accident. Idaho Code §72-432(1 ). It is axiomatic
that additional medical treatment may lead to an increase or possibly reduction in impairment

1

The Respondent would also direct the Court to I.C. §72-719 which specifically allows the Industrial Commission,
upon petition or its own review, to "make an award ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously
agreed upon or awarded ... " Thus, even assuming for sake of argument that Appellant's position is correct; nothing
would have precluded McGivney from seeking a modification as to permanent impairment within 5 years of the date
of the 2011 accident.

- - - - - -------

- -----
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rating and/or permanent restrictions. In this case, McGivney made a timely claim for impairment
and disability benefits referable to his 2011 injuries, and the Commission made the determination
of impairment and disability following McGivney's medical stability.
"Maximum Medical Improvement" (more commonly referred to as MMI) can be more
clearly understood in looking to the definition of the same in the AMA Guides to the Evaluation
of Permanent Impairment, 6th Ed. (2009), p. 26:
There can be some scenarios with individuals now at MMI but
with potential for future progression of their disease. For example,
an individual exposed to asbestos who is currently stable with
perhaps some current objective findings that are unlikely to change
in the next 12 months but with a potential for malignancy in the
distant future. Nevertheless, these individuals can be rated based
on the current findings with the notation of a potential for
progression in the distant future.
Thus, MMI represents a point in time in the recovery process after
an injury when further fonnal medical or surgical intervention
cannot be expected to improve the underlying impairment.
Therefore, MMI is not predicated on the elimination of symptoms
and/or subjective complaints. Also, MMI can be determined if
recovery has reached the stage where symptoms can be expected to
remain stable with the passage of time, or can be managed with
palliative measures that do not alter the underlying impairment
substantially, within medical probability.
Maximum Medical Improvement does not preclude the
deterioration of a condition that is expected to occur with the
passage of time or as a result of the normal aging process; nor does
it preclude allowance for ongoing follow-up for optimal
maintenance of the medical condition in question. (emphasis
added).

Aerocet/SIF has cited and reviewed this Court's decision in Horton coming to the

·---------
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conclusion that particular decision is not applicable in this case because, unlike Horton,
McGivney's injury was fixed and stable. Aerocet/SIF Brief p. 23, citing Horton v. Garrett
Freightlines, Inc., 115 Idaho 912, 772 P.2d 119 (1989) and Horton v. Garrett Freightlines,
Inc., 106 Idaho 895, 684 P.2d 297 (1984). Although McGivney was found medically stable in
2011 and assigned a permanent impairment rating, like the Horton case, his industrial condition
was noted, even at that time, as having a component of progressive degenerative changes that
required further medical treatment. McGivney eventually needed additional medical treatment
which the treating physician and IME physician related, in part, to the 2011 accident and injury.
The evidence reviewed by the Commission was not generated by any one party, and
evidence relied upon by the Commission by way of documentation and testimony specifically
related to both McGivney' s 2011 and 2014 injuries and the resultant permanent impairment and
disability for each. As the finder of fact, the Commission can accept or reject various medical
opinions, testimony of the parties, and testimony of experts as it sees fit, as long as the
Commission provides a reasonable rationale for such decision. In this case, the Commission
reviewed hundreds of pages of medical and vocational records, hearing testimony, and expert
medical and vocational testimony in coming to its well-reasoned and logical conclusion that
McGivney's medical condition following his 2011 injury and medical stability therefor
deteriorated prior to the 2014 injury, and that a combination of his 2011 and 2014 injuries
contributed to McGivney' s need for the particular surgical procedure (knee replacement). The
Commission reasoned:
McGivney has been given a 21 % lower extremity impairment rating for his left

·-----
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knee. Dr. Mcinnis originally proposed that following the 2011 meniscectomy,
McGivney was entitled to a 2% lower extremity rating, with no impairment
assigned to McGivney's preexisting left knee arthritis. Dr. McNulty
acknowledged that this 2% rating was appropriate at the time it was issued.
However, Dr. McNulty ultimately concluded that half of McGivney's current
21 % lower extremity rating should be apportioned to the 2011 accident.
Explaining his reasoning, he testified that the 2011 meniscectomy destabilized
McGivney's left knee, and caused the progression of arthritic changes in the
medial compartment of the left knee much faster than would otherwise have
happened. Proof of this acceleration is found in the bilateral knee x-rays
performed after the 2014 accident. These films demonstrate much more severe
degenerative arthritis in the left medial compartment as compared to the right
medial compartment. At the same time, Dr. McNulty and Dr. Lyman proposed
that the 2014 accident caused additional trauma to the medial compartment; and
had further hastened McGivney's need for the uni-compartmental knee
[replacement]. Based on these findings, Dr. McNulty believes it appropriate to
apportion McGivney's impairment on a 50-50 basis as between the accident of
2011 and the accident of 2014, with no apportionment to whatever mild
degenerative changes McGivney may have had in the left knee prior to the 2011
accident. Dr. Lyman, the surgeon who performed McGivney's left knee
arthroplasty, concurs with this analysis. While we recognize that following the
2011 accident McGivney was given only a 2% lower extremity rating, and
released without limitations/restrictions, the important point is that McGivney's
left knee condition continued to deteriorate following the date of Dr. Mcinnis'
rating, and that this deterioration has been persuasively linked to the 2011
accident. By the time of the 2014 accident, McGivney's medial compartment
arthritis had significantly progressed to Grade III-IV changes, with the two areas
of complete cartilage loss. The accident-caused progression of McGivney's left
knee condition between 2011 and 2014 amply supports the apportionment scheme
arrived at by Dr. McNulty.
IC Decision pp. 20-21, AR 128-129.
Appellants Aerocet/SIF are simply wrong in asserting that the Commission failed, in its
lengthy and reasoned analysis of the evidence in this case, to analyze McGivney's impairment
rating from his 2011 injury. Based upon the medical evidence that led to the necessary
conclusion that McGivney's knee replacement surgery and the resultant impairment and

-
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restrictions were referable to both the 2011 and 2014 accidents, the Commission then provided
its analysis evidence in supporting its finding that McGivney suffered a 21 % lower extremity
permanent impairment, that he was entitled to 50% disability inclusive of impairment as a result
of his left knee condition, and that medical and impairment/disability benefits should be
apportioned and liability split evenly 50/50 between the Employers/Sureties responsible for each
of the 2011 and 2014 accidents. The Commission further clarified that no impairment or
disability was attributed to McGivney's non-industrial arthritis condition which pre-dated both
industrial events.
While the permanent impairment rating assigned in 2011 may have been proper at the
time, McGivney' s medical condition relating to his 2011 injuries deteriorated and required
additional medical treatment. McGivney made a timely claim for additional medical treatment,
impairment and disability benefits referable to his 2011 injuries, and the Commission properly
made the determination of impairment and disability following medical stability.
C. The Commission properly determined McGivney's disability and applied Idaho Code
§72-425 as of the time of hearing.
Nothing in Idaho Code §72-425 dictates that disability must be determined on the date
that maximum medical improvement has been reached. Permanent impairment is determined
upon maximum medial improvement. The plain language of the Statute states permanent
impairment is a component of and contributing factor to the extent of permanent disability, thus
disability cannot be evaluated until maximum medical improvement. Idaho Code §72-425.
Disability is defined by Idaho Code §72-425 as follows:

-----------------·----.-··----··----···--------·---·---
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Permanent disability evaluation. "Evaluation"
(rating)
of
permanent
disability" is an appraisal of the injured employee's present and probable future
ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical factor of
permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors as provided in section
72-430, Idaho Code.
As to a determination of permanent disability, Idaho Code §72-430(1) provides:
(1) Matters to be considered. In determining percentages of permanent
disabilities, account shall be taken of the nature of the physical disablement, the
disfigurement if of a kind likely to handicap the employee in procuring or holding
employment, the cumulative effect of multiple injuries, the occupation of the
employee, and his age at the time of accident causing the injury, or manifestation
of the occupational disease, consideration being given to the diminished ability of
the afflicted employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable
geographical area considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the
employee, and other factors as the Commission may deem relevant ... (emphasis
added).
Although in Stoddard the Court stated that the date of MMI was the proper date for a
disability analysis, the Court pointed out in Brown that the reference in Stoddard actually cited
I.C. §72-422, which defined permanent impairment. Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho
186,192,207 P.3d 162, 168 (2009); Brown v. Home Depot, 152 Idaho 605,609,272 P.3d 577,
581 (2012). Thus, the Brown Court pointed out, the holding in Stoddard was meant to emphasize
that disability cannot be evaluated until MMI had been reached. Brown, 152 Idaho at 609.
Aerocet/SIF's narrow interpretation of the Brown decision raises a significant dilemma in
workers' compensation law. Aside from the fact that I.C. §72-430 (1) specifically identifies that
disability is determined by factors "as the Commission may deem relevant ... ", it is not a
physician's job to determine apportionment of disability. It is a doctor's job in the workers'
compensation setting to evaluate, treat, rate, and restrict a patient. It is within a physician's
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expertise to make a determination as to whether a condition and the need for a particular course
of treatment was referable to a new injury, or as in this case, referable to a combination of
multiple causes. As in this case, a patient may present with injury superimposed on a prior injury
or condition that may require the physician to apportion the impairment rating and restrictions.
In this case, apportionment of the impairment was based not on a "medical guestimate,"
but upon the physicians' best assessments of the available medical evidence. See Appellants'
Brief p. 25. Viewing all of the evidence available, the physicians opined McGivney's need for
surgery and the resultant impairment was equally due to McGivney's 2011 and 2014 injuries.
Quest/Federal would reiterate that the opinion comes not only from the IME of Dr. McNulty, but
also from the treating surgeon, Dr. Lyman. Aerocet/SIF failed to produce any contrary evidence
to provide the Industrial Commission with an alternative scenario. The physicians then imposed
restrictions relating to McGivney's permanent left knee condition. It is not within a physician's
expertise to take the rating and restrictions and then conduct a vocational analysis of non-medical
factors that might impact a particular injured workers' ability to be gainfully employed.
Honestly, what doctor has the time or inclination to burrow into a patient's background of
knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform a disability analysis? The answer is "none." To that
point, and for the Commission and the Justices, the question posed is whether and to what extent
the impairment and other medical and nonmedical factors results in disability above impairment
for each of the separate and discrete industrial injuries to McGivney's left knee.
The issue of disability for the 2011 injury could have been, but certainly was not litigated
or settled after McGivney was deemed medically stable in November of 2011. There was no

---~ ----~
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disability determination at that time, or any time before 2014, yet Aerocet/SIF assert that the
Commission at that time would have had "no alternative but to determine as to the 2011 injury
McGivney failed to establish any disability in excess of impairment." Appellants' Brief p. 24.
Considering the fact that Claimant had a 5 year statute of limitations within which to file a
Complaint to put at issue "disability" (see, I.C. §72-706(2)), and then ask for a Hearing to prove
his case, Aerocet/SIF's argument is ill-taken as any such deadline would not have run until
approximately two years after the second industrial accident occurred. Even if Appellant's were
true, and Respondents do not concede that point, the Commission had no choice but to consider
all of the available medical evidence relating to McGivney's 2011 injury at the Hearing
conducted in November of 2016. The medical evidence clearly proves McGivney's medical
condition deteriorated and he required additional medical treatment relating to his 2011 injury.
To limit the assessment of McGivney's 2011 injury to condition in 2011 would effectively
disregard the impairment that is related to the 2011 injury and thereby falsely manipulate the
disability determination. The proper way to evaluate McGivney's 2011 disability in this case, or
his "present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity" per Idaho Code §72-425,
was to determine the totality of disability from all causes at of the time of the hearing on
November 8, 2016.
This Court in the case of Page vs. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302 (2008), made it
quite clear that the Industrial Commission is required to articulate and evaluate the Claimant's
disability not only according to the factors set forth in I.C. §72-430(1 ), but also to make findings
as to permanent disability in light of all of the noted physical impairments, including pre-existing
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conditions; and, then apportion the amount of the of permanent disability attributable to a
Claimant's industrial accident.

This is exactly the type of analysis that occurred in this case.

The part that Aerocet/SIF seems to ignore is that the same analysis would have been required to
be performed by the Industrial Commission even if the two industrial claims had not been
consolidated.
The proper issue and focus at Hearing was: What was McGivney's total disability at the
time of Hearing (per Brown)?; What percentage of the total disability was referable to each of the
industrial injury(ies)?; and, What percentage of disability was referable to any preexisting
injury(ies) or condition(s)? The plain wording of the statute does not distinguish or modify that
determination based on whether the preexisting injury or condition is the result of degenerative,
congenital, or industrial injuries or conditions. Based on all of the evidence available, and based
on the physicians' expertise, the physicians opined McGivney's need for knee replacement
surgery and the resultant impairment was equally due to McGivney's 2011 and 2012 injuries.
Based thereon, the Commission found McGivney was entitled to permanent partial impairment
of 21 % lower extremity, and disability of 50% whole person inclusive of impairment. The
Commission apportioned the impairment and disability as between the 2011 and 2014 accidents,
at the same time outlining why there was no impairment or disability attributed to any other
preexisting or nonindustrial condition. Aerocet/SIF challenge as to the amount of disability and
the amount apportioned to the 2011 iajury is "factual" and simply a request that this Court rehash facts and testimony considered at the Commission level.

------
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As Commission properly determined McGivney's disability and applied Idaho Code §72425 as of the time of Hearing, the Commission's assessment of impairment and disability should
not be disturbed on appeal. Once that determination was made, it is well settled law that a liable
Employer/Sureties is responsible for only their proportionate share of the benefits owed.

D. Defendants Quest/Federal are entitled to contribution and reimbursement for benefits
paid pending determination of McGivney's statutory benefits
Aerocet/SIF concede the Commission has jurisdiction to consider a claim for
reimbursement but asserts Quest/Federal have no right to reimbursement. Appellant correctly
notes that the Commission issued an Amended Order on October 28, 2015 requiring
Quest/Federal to pay contested worker's compensation benefits. McGivney's Motion for An
Order Pursuant to J.C. §72-313 Compelling Quest Aircraft (Employer) and Federal Insurance
Company (Surety) To Pay McGivney McGivney's Past Due Total Temporary Disability and
Medical Benefits (hereinafter "Motion for Payment") was brought under J.C. §72-313, which in
the plain language of the Statute provides for reimbursement claims.
Idaho Code §72-313 provides:
Payment pending determination of policy coverage. Whenever any claim is
presented and the McGivney's right to compensation is not in issue, but the issue
of liability is raised as between an employer and a surety or between two (2) or
more employers or sureties, the commission shall order payment of compensation
to be made immediately by one or more of such employers or sureties. The
commission may order any such employer or surety to deposit the amount of the
award or to give such security thereof as may be deemed satisfactory. When the
issue is finally resolved, an employer or surety held not liable shall be reimbursed
for any such payments by the employer or surety held liable and any deposit or
security so made shall be returned. [emphasis added].

-----------
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McGivney's Motion for Payment specifically raised the issue of Quest/Federal's right to
seek, and the Commission's ability to protect that interest in receiving reimbursement "should
Aerocet/State Insurance Fund ultimately be determined to be the responsible party ... " AR 43.
Aerocet/SIF's objection to the Motion for Payment in September of 2015 (AR 42-43), and
opposition at this time is based on facts that were weighed and ruled upon by the Commission.
The Commission ordered payment of benefits pending a determination of the comparative
responsibility of benefits owed as between the two Employers and Sureties pursuant to Idaho
Code §72-313. AR 47. The Commission then clarified the Order limiting those benefits payable
pursuant to the Motion for Payment pursuant to J.C. §72-313 solely to Quest/Federal. The novel
argument that somehow the §72-313 Order to pay benefits is determinative of the ultimate issue
before the Commission without a determination of liability, medical causation, necessity or
reasonableness of medical care, or any analysis of non-medical factors - on the merits is not
supported by the facts or the law.
Although the employer takes an employee as he finds him, the employer is not
responsible for any more impairment or disability than is referable to the claimed industrial
accident. See Wynn v. J.R. Simplot Co., 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629 (1983). In the end,
whether Aerocet/SIF liked it, or not, they had an open claim from 2011 that subjected them to
exposure for additional benefits should McGivney desire the same.
While there have been changes to Idaho's Worker's Compensation statutes since 1990
when this Court heard the case of Brooks vs. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 117 Idaho 1066 (1990),
the concepts of the duties and responsibilities of the Industrial Commission in evaluating a

.
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particular claimant's claim for compensation has not changed since the following was written in
the Brooks' opinion:
Aetna further argues that the responsibility for medical expenses
and disability benefits should be apportioned between the parties in
equal one-thirds based on Dr. Moss' testimony. The Commission
must be presumed by its experience to be able to judge the
causative factors in a particular case, and be allowed a degree of
latitude in making an apportionment. Clark v. Brennan
Construction Co., 84 Idaho 384, 372 P.2d 761 (1962). In Clark,
the Claimant suffered from a non-compensable pre-existing back
injury, and two subsequent back injuries involving two separate
employers and their respective sureties. Following the second
injury, the Industrial Accident Board apportioned total temporary
disability on the basis of 50% to each employer and surety, and
one-third of the hospital and medical expenses to each employer,
with the remaining one-third of such expenses to the Claimant,
finding it was related to the pre-existing back infirmity. In Clark,
this Court recognized that presentation of evidence of the cause,
origin and extent of disability was dependent upon testimony from
expert witnesses and that it was within the province of the Board to
find the causes of disability and to apportion those causes between
an industrial injury and a pre-existing injury as well as between
successive industrial injuries. Likewise, this Court in Wilson v.
Gardner Associated, Inc., 91 Idaho 496, 426 P.2d 567 (1967),
held:
Subsequent to enactment of this provision, [the predecessor to the
current Idaho Code § 72-405] this Court has recognized the
apportionment of compensation is to be made as between disability
caused by or resulting from industrial accident and disability
caused by or resulting from pre-existing injury, disease or
condition residual from previous injury, and that the ratio of
apportionment is for the Board's determination.
91 Idaho at 502,426 P.2d at 573.
Apportionment of disability is a factual issue, therefore the
Commission is free to accept or reject medical evidence and
testimony. Id. When apportionment is supported by substantial and
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competent, although conflicting evidence, it will not be overturned
on appeal. Nigherbon v. Ralph E Feller Trucking, Inc., 109
Idaho 233, 706 P.2d 1344 (1985); Lopez v. Amalgamated Sugar
Co., 107 Idaho 590,691 P.2d 1205 (1984); Earl v. Swift & Co., 93
Idaho 546, 467 P.2d 589 (1970).
Brooks v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 117 Idaho 1066, 793 P.2d 1238,
(1990)
In this case, McGivney had a 2011 injury, which was treated and for which he received
an impairment rating. However, undisputed medical evidence proves McGivney's condition
deteriorated between 2011 and 2014. Medical evidence further proves that McGivney's need for
uni compartmental knee replacement was due in part to the condition of his knee referable to his
2011 injury. McGivney then suffered a second left knee iajury in 2014, and the combination of
the 2011 injury, the deterioration of the knee as a result of that 2011 injury, and the new injury
suffered in 2014 led the treating physician to perform knee replacement surgery. The
Commission analyzed and weighed the medical evidence and expert testimony before it provided
detailed reasoning that the objective medical evidence supported apportionment of the need for
surgery. Although McGivney was medically stable at one point following his 2011 injury, he did
not litigate or settle that claim, and there was no determination at that time of disability. The
claim was not "done," but rather, the claim remained open as to any medical treatment or any
other benefits deemed referable to his 2011 injury.
McGivney made a timely claim for additional benefits relating to the 2011 claim.
Pending a determination of liability for medical treatment as well as related impairment and
disability, benefits were paid by Quest/Federal. Payment of benefits pursuant to Idaho Code §72-
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313 is intended to protect the injured worker caught between disputes of two insurance
companies and allow him to obtain needed medical treatment and time loss benefits during his
recovery. It also protects an Employer/Surety if the Commission ultimately determines that
Employer/Surety is not responsible for the claimed benefits.
Aerocet/SIF raises factual arguments as to why medical, impairment, and disability
benefits should not be apportioned, and suggests that apportionment of the total disability
somehow modified their substantive rights. The Commission's award of medical and time loss
benefits, impairment and disability is supported by substantial and competent evidence, and as
such, the Commission properly determined Quest/Federal is entitled to reimbursement for
benefits paid pending the Commission's determination of liability pursuant to Idaho Code §72313.

V.
CLAIM l<'OR ATTORNEY FEES

Pursuant to the provisions of I.A.R. 41(a), the Respondents m this matter make
application for an award of attorney fees.
Specifically, Idaho Code §72-804, permits "attorney fees on appeal where the employer
or its surety unreasonably brought or contested a claim." Rish v. Home Depot, Inc., 161 Idaho
702,707,390 P.3d 428,433 (2017) (quoting Morris v. Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc., 154 Idaho 633,
640, 301 P.3d 639, 646 (2013)). As has been pointed out several different times in the body of
this brief, the Appellants are simply asking this court to rehash factual determinations made by
the Idaho Industrial Commission. The complaints against the procedural actions of the Industrial
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Commission are without any merit whatsoever. None of the issues raised by the Appellants are
unique, or of a first impression for decision by this court.
The arguments made by Aerocet/SIF that the Commission somehow erred in addressing
permanent impairment and permanent disability in the context of a consolidated set of claims is
simply nonsensical for the simple reason that applicable statutes of limitations had not run as
against McGivney as of the date of the second industrial accident in 2014 - and in fact, Mr.
McGivney had approximately two years after that second accident within which to build a case
for seeking an award of additional benefits and asking for Hearing on the same.

The State

Insurance Fund knew full well that Mr. McGivney' s 2011 claim was not "done," or procedurally
structured such that he was precluded from seeking any additional benefits. To use this as the
basis for presenting such an issue on appeal clearly warrants an award of attorney fees.
Lastly, in regard to the complaints about the Industrial Commission apportioning
disability between two separate industrial accidents, Quest/Federal reiterates that no more
compelling set of facts can exist for exploring apportionment than a situation where an injured
worker has two distinct industrial accidents within a relatively short period of time which
resulted in injuries to the exact same portion of the anatomy ·· both of which resulted in damage
to the physical structure the body warranting permanent impairment, and both of which resulted
in residual symptomology impacting the injured worker's activities of daily living. Aerocet/SIF
has unreasonably brought such arguments before the Court as part of this appeal.

..

..
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VI.

CONCLUSION
The Commission properly weighed and considered the medical evidence presented on the
issues properly before the Commission. It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial
Commission's Finding of Facts, Conclusion of Law, and Order dated December 22, 2017 be
upheld, and attorney fees and costs be awarded to Respondents.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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